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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OUT OF
STATE DIVORCES SINCE THE WILLIAMS CASES
It has long been the law that all out of state divorce decrees must
be accorded full faith and credit in every state under the Federal Con-
stitution' unless it can be shown that the court rendering such decree
was without jurisdiction over the plaintiff. In Williams v. North Caro-
lina J2 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the case of Haddock v. Had-
dock3 which made the matrimonial domicile the test for jurisdiction
and substituted for it the rule that the plaintiff, at least, be domiciled
within the state where the decree is sought if the court is to have juris-
diction. It further ruled that a decree of divorce rendered by a court
which had jurisdiction over the plaintiff must be accorded full faith
and credit in every state of the Union under the Constitution even
though service on the defendant was made by publication. In Williams
v. North Carolina JJ4 the Court followed the decision of Bell v. Bell5 in
holding that a divorce decree may be subject to reexamination on the
question of the jurisdiction of the court rendering such decree, and
that this could de done not only in the matrimonial domicile but in any
state wherein the judgment may be called into question. Should it be
shown that the court, which rendered the decree, was without juris-
diction (i.e. the plaintiff was not actually domiciled within the state
and according to the state law where the court was located) the decree
is invalid and as such would not need to be recognized under the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution.6 The divorce decree could,
however, be recognized as a matter of comity. 7 The fact that the de-
cree recited a finding of the court that it had jurisdiction over the plain-
tiff was held not to be conclusive and therefore the decree was subject
to attack either directly or collaterly.
Thus a party who had obtained a divorce in a state other than the
one in which he resided or which had been his matrimonial domicile,
(hereinafter called a foreign divorce) was in actual doubt as to the
validity of the decree itself and therefore insecure in any future action
which the decree ostensibly made possible. The state courts have how-
ever either recognized the decrees as a matter of comity' or have fre-
1 German Saving & Loan Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U.S. 125, 48 L.Ed. 373, 24
S.Ct. 221 (1904) ; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873).
2317 U.S. 287, 87 L.Ed. 279, 63 S.Ct. 207, 143 ALR 1273 (1942).
3201 U.S. 562, 50 L.Ed. 867, 26 S.Ct. 525 (1906).
4325 U.S. 226, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 157 ALR 1366 (1945); see also
Husserl, "Some Reflections on Williams v. North Carolina II," 32 Va.L.Rev.
555 (1946).5 181 U.S. 175, 45 L.Ed. 804, 21 S.Ct. 551 (1901).
6 U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section I.
7Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N.W. 262, 43 ALR 567 (1925); Gilder-
sleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684 (1914).
8 Supra, note 7.
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quently applied the equitable doctrine of estoppel in order to limit the
attacks upon such foreign divorce decrees.
In most states, a party who has obtained a foreign divorce decree
is estopped from attacking it :9 That this is not a true estoppel was
conceeded by the New York Court in Krause v. Krause."' The court
cautioned that this did not mean that the foreign decree was being
recognized as valid but rather that a party would not be permitted to
attack a divorce decree which he had actively and voluntarily procured.
The second wife or husband is usually allowed to attack a foreign
decree as invalid on the theory that where the state is an interested
party, the doctrine of pari delicto and the equitable doctrine as to "clean
hands" are inapplicable." If the second spouse has affirmatively aided
the other in procuring the decree, that spouse will also be estopped.' 2
The spouse against whom the foreign decree was rendered can also
attack it except that if he has relied and acted on the decree such as
marrying a third party or some other action equally inconsistent with
its invalidity, he or she will be estopped from challenging it. 3 In Frost
v. Frost 4 the doctrine of estoppel was invoked by the New York Court
against a party who appeared in the foreign divorce action and there
had a decree of absolute divorce rendered against him on the theory
that he had opportunity to litigate in the out-of-state court the question
of jurisdiction and not having availed himself of it, could not now be
heard to question the determination of the jurisdictional facts by the
court which rendered the decree.
Although the application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel can
silence an attack upon a foreign divorce decree, the invalidity of the
9 Ellis v. White, 61 Iowa 644, 17 N.W. 28 (1883); Appeal of McGraw, 228
Mich. 1, 199 N.W. 686, 37 ALR 308 (1924) ; In Hunter v. Hunter, 70 Hun.
598, 24 N.Y.S.(2d) 76 (1940), the court said: "The very act of obtaining a
decree dissolving the marriage is so inconsistent with the continued existence
of the marital status as to estop one later from asserting its existence or
validity."
20282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.(2d) 290 (1940)-Action brought by second wife for
separation. Defendant attempted to avoid liability because of the alleged
invalidity of a Nevada decree which he procurred from his first wife.
"1 Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App.D.C. 216, 19 F. (2d) 690, 54 ALR 75 (1927);
Frey v. Frey, 61 App.D.C. 232, 59 F.(2d) 1046 (1932).
12Re Davis, 38 Cal.App.(2d) 579, 101 Pac.(2d) 761 (1940); Goodloe v. Hawk,
72 App.D.C. 287, 113 F.(2d) 753 (1940); Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22,
19 N.Y.S.(2d) 667 (1940); In Heller v. Heller, 172 Misc. 875, 15 N.Y.S.(2d)
469 (1939), estoppel was invoked even though challenging spouse did not
participate in the divorce but did cohabit with the other spouse after the in-
validity of the foreign divorce decree was discovered. But in Illinois, the
court refused to invoke the equitable doctrine of estoppel even though the
challenging party did affirmatively aid the other spouse in procurring the
challenged decree. The court based its refusal on the same theory as in the
Simmons case and the Frey case, supra note 11. Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill.
App. 152, 9 N.E.(2d) 645 (1937).
'3 Carbone v. Carbone, 166 Misc. 924, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) (1938); Marvin v. Foster,
61 Minn. 154, 63 N.W. 484 (1895) ; Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 81,
10 A.L.R. 693 (1890).
14260 App.Div.694, 23 N.Y.S.(2d) 754 (1940).
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decree itself is not changed. It can be subsequently attacked by any
party competent to do so. 1- It is thus possible for a party with a foreign
divorce decree to be married in one state and divorced in another, or
if he has married a third party, to be guilty of bigamy in one state and
not in another. Therefore the application of the doctrine of estoppel
does not solve the situation in which a party holding a foreign divorce
decree finds himself.
It is this contradictory situation which has been so often criticized.
In June, 1948, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision,
which, to a certain degree, has placed some of the foreign divorce de-
crees on a more secure footing. It decided in Sherrer v. Sherrer'6 and
its companion case of Coe v. Coe,1 7 that where the defendant appears
in a divorce action with full opportunity to litigate the question of jur-
isdiction and the court before which he makes his appearance makes a
determination that it has jurisdiction over the plaintiff because he has
a bona fide domicile within the state, and subsequently renders a de-
cree of divorce, that decree must be accorded full faith and credit un-
der the Federal Constitution and the finding of the jurisdictional fact
is conclusive and res adjudicata. This adjudication of the jurisdictional
question being conclusive on the parties and res adjudicata, bars in
any of the other states all subsequent attacks on the decree because
of the lack of jurisdiction.
In the Sherrer case"' the husband and wife were domiciled in
Massachusetts. The wife left for Florida ostensibly for a vacation and
took with her their two children. Having arrived there, she informed
the husband by letter of her intention not to return. After residing in
Florida for ninety-three days, she filed her petition for divorce. The
Florida law requires at least ninety days of bona fide residence in the
state before the institution of a divorce action. The husband who was
notified by mail of the action, retained Florida counsel who not only
entered a general appearance but also filed an answer denying Mrs.
Sherrer's allegation of bona fide residence. Mr. Sherrer subsequently
arrived in Florida and with his wife executed a stipulation in regard
to the custody of the children. At the hearing, the husband's attorney
made no cross-examination or offered any evidence as to the jurisdic-
tion of the court or as to the merits of the action. A decree was en-
tered for Mrs. Sherrer and Mr. Sherrer did not prosecute any appeal.
The husband, subsequent to the Florida divorce decree, sought an
adjudication in Massachusetts that he be permitted to sell his real estate
as if he were sole and that he was living apart from his wife for justifi-
15 Matter of Thomann's Estate, 144 Misc. 497, 285 N.Y.S.(2d) 838 (1932).16333 U.S. 68 S.Ct. 1087 (1948).
17333 U.S .. 68 S.Ct. 1094 (1948).
18 Supra, note 16.
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able cause. Thus the validity of the Florida decree was attacked. The
trial court on the direction of the Massuchusetts Supreme Court,
found on the evidence that the Florida court never had jurisdiction
over the plaintiff and consequently the decree was invalid and not en-
titled to full faith and credit as a judgment of a sister state.
In the companion case of Coe v. Coe 9 the facts were very similar.
The wife brought action for separate support in the marital domicile
of Massachusetts. The husband filed a cross-complaint for divorce
which was later dismissed. The court awarded separate support to
Mrs. Coe who appealed, not being satisfied as to the amount awarded.
Pending the appeal, Mr. Coe left for Nevada. After the requisite time
of six week's had lapsed, he filed a complaint for divorce. Mrs. Coe
received notice by mail and immediately went to Nevada, retained an
attorney and demurred to the complaint. Then after making a written
agreement with Mr. Coe providing for a lump sum payment and ali-
mony, she filed an answer admitting the plaintiff's residence in Nevada
and a cross-complaint for an absolute divorce. The divorce was granted
to Mrs. Coe and the agreement adopted by the court. Mr. Coe then
married in Reno and returned to Massachusetts.
About five months after the culmination of the Reno action, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the separate support order
and Mrs. Coe petitioned the Massachusetts court to have her husband
cited for contempt for refusing to pay as per the court order for sepa-
rate support. Mr. Coe introduced the Nevada decree as defense. The
trial court, at the direction of the Supreme Court, found on the evi-
dence submitted that neither party were ever domiciled in Nevada
and the divorce decree therefore invalid.
The two cases presented to the U.S. Supreme Court the following
question: ". . .what effect is to be given to an adjudication by a court
that it possesses requisite jurisdiction in a case, [both parties appearing,]
where the judgment of that court is subsequently subjected to collateral
attack on jurisdictional grounds."' 2
The Court reversed both cases and answered the question thus:
The requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from
collaterly attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the
courts of a sister State where there has been participation by the de-
fendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendent has been ac-
corded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictiontl issues, and where
the decree is not suscepitable to such collateral attack in the courts of
the state which rendered the decree."
1 Supra, note 17.
20 68 S.Ct. 1087 at page 1090.
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The Court points out the Stoll v. Gottlieb21 case and the Davis v.
Davis22 case as indicating the result of the question before the court.
It says that those cases stand for the application, to the facts before it,
of the rule in Federal Courts that where either jurisdiction or subject
matter are adjudicated in actions where that question was in issue and
the parties had full opportunity to litigate, the determinations of the
court are res adjudicata.
The Stoll case was an action in a State court on a guarantee by the
holder of a guaranteed bond, to set aside a previous Federal District
Court order on the grounds that the Federal court did not have juris-
diction. On certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court it was held that a
previous determination of the matter adversely to the respondent in
the Federal District Court, was res adjudicata since the actual contro-
versy over the jurisdiction of the court was raised and decided in that
proceeding and therefore the validity of the court order could not be
challenged in the state court on the grounds of jurisdiction.
In the Davis case, the wife challenged the validity of a Virginia
divorce decree in the District of Columbia on the ground that the Vir-
ginia court lacked jurisdiction. During the suit in Virginia, she ap-
peared and actively litigated there the question of jurisdiction which
was determined adversely to her. The District of Columbia court
found, on duly presented evidence, that the Virginia court lacked juris-
diction and so refused to accord to the Virginia decree full faith and
credit. The U.S. Supreme Court with no dissenting opinion, reversed
the lower court and said that the Virginia decree deserved recognition
under the full faith and credit clause because that court actually had
jurisdiction. Nothing is said in the decision that the finding of the
Virginia court was res adjudicata; on the contrary, the Supreme Court
found on the evidence that the District of Columbia court was in error
and that Virginia did have jurisdiction when the decree was rendered.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with Mr. Justice Murphy concurring, notes in
his dissenting opinion to the Sherrer and the Coe cases, that in the
Davis case, the Supreme Court" . . .found that the state granting a
divorce was in fact that of the domicile. '23
It is to be noted that in both the Stoll case and the Davis case, cited
by the Supreme Court as indicating the result to be reached in the
Sherrer and the Coe cases, the question of the jurisdiction of the court
rendering the decree was fully and thoroughly litigated in that court
before it rendered the challenged judgment. In the Sherrer case, al-
though the question of jurisdiction was raised in the answer, the mat-
21 305 U.S. 165, 83 L.Ed. 104, 59 S.Ct. 134 (1938).
22305 U.S. 32, 83 L.Ed. 26, 59 S.Ct. 3, 118 A.L.R. 1518 (1938).
23 68 S.Ct. 1097 at page 1098.
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ter was not actually litigated at the hearing. In the Coe case, the de-
fendant admitted the residence of the plaintiff and so never even raised
the question. Mr. Justice Vinson in rendering the decision, stated that
in the action brought in the state which granted the divorce, the defen-
dant had full opportunity to litigate there the question of judrisdiction
and having failed to avail himself of it, the affirmative decision on that
subject was res adjudicata and entitled to full faith and credit in every
other state.
In the dissenting opinion,2 4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out that
a marriage contract is different from any other contract and that society
and the state are both vitaly interested in it. The majority decision
makes it possible for both spouses to evade the laws of their domicile
and to encourage perjury. It forecloses the state from inquiring into
the dissolution of that marriage contract in which it has an interest. It
makes it possible for the parties by an arranged litigation to foreclose
the interest of the state in their marriage contract. It in effect applies
the law of private interests to the marital relationship.
The decision in the two cases to treat a divorce decree in the same
manner as a judgment in a private controversy, and to render a finding
of jurisdiction as res adjudicata where both parties appear and have
available ample opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional question, seems
broad enough to foreclose action by third parties attacking the decree
on the ground of jurisdiction.
The decision is not entirely without precedent. In 1919, the Illinois
court in Blakeslee v. Blakeslee25 decided that ". . . where the question
of jurisdiction has been raised in the proceedings in the sister state
and is there adjudicated, such decision becomes res adjudicata." On
the basis of the Davis case 8 the Michigan court in ,Pratt v. Miedena2l 7
decided that the finding of the Nevada court, that the plaintiff had
Nevada domicile where th defendant raised that question, was res
adjudicata. A petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was
denied." The New York Court in April, 1947, in the case of Sullivan
v. Sullivan2 9 indicated thatit believed that the finding of the Florida
court that it had jurisdiction after that question was raised by the de-
fendant, was entitled to-recognition under the full faith and credit
24 Supra, note 23.
25213 IIl.App.168 (1919), Defendant appeared and filed answer in Nevada court
action for divorce. Defendant questioned jurisdiction of foreign court which
decided adversely to her and on appeal was affirmed. Defendant then sought
separate maintenance in Illinois and questioned the decree on jurisdictional
grounds. Illinois court decided the question of jurisdiction was res adjudicata.
26 Supra, note 22.
27 311 Mich. 64, 18 N.W.(2d) 279 (1945).
28 326 U.S. 739, 90 L.Ed. 441, 66 S.Ct. 49 (1945).
2962 App.Div. 624, 71 N.Y.S. (2d) 120 (1947).
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clause of the Federal Constitution and therefore could not be attacked
collaterally.
It thus appears that the U.S. Supreme Court is following the trend
in its latest effort to make more certain and to restrict the uncertainty
of the validity of the foreign divorce decrees. If one takes divorce de-
crees and eliminates the interest of the state, then these latest Supreme
Court decisions follow logically. If one remembers the prime and vital
interest which the state and society have in the continuance or in the
dissolution of the marriages of its residents, then the decision makes
it possible for the residents to evade the law of their domicile and for
states with lax divorce laws to impress their policy on states where
divorces are tightly regulated.
It is to be noted that Senator McCarran of Nevada has introduced
a bill in the Senate with the purpose of making foreign divorce decrees
more certain. It is intended that the bill be enacted under the power
conferred on the Congress by the full faith and credit clause" of the
U.S. Constitution. The bill is as follows:
"Where a State has exercised through its courts jurisdiction
to dissolve the marriage of spouses, the decree of divorce thus
rendered must be given full faith and credit in every other
State as a dissolution of such marriage, provided (1) the de-
cree is final; (2) the decree is valid in the State where rendered;
(3) the decree contains recitals setting forth the jurisdictional
prerequisites of the State to the granting of the divorce have
been met; and (4) the state wherein the divorce was rendered
was the last State wherein the spouses were domiciled together
as husband and wife, or the defendant in the proceeding for
divorce was personally subject to the jurisdiction of the State
wherein the decree was rendered or appeared generally in the
proceedings therefor. In all such cases except cases involving
intrinsic fraud the recitals of the decree of divorce shall con-
stitute a conclusive determination of the jurisdictional facts
necessary to the decree."'"
That a divorce decree in the state wherein the plaintiff was
domiciled and the defendant was personally subject to the jurisdiction
of the state rendering it, is conclusive and must be accorded full faith
and credit in every state whether that defendant appears or not, has
long been the law.32 The Sherrer and the Coe cases now make a divorce
decree wherein the defendant appears generally, conclusive and also en-
titled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause. It appears
that the Supreme Court has now accomplished to a great extent the
purpose desired by Senate Bill 1960.
30 Supra, note 6.
31 S. 1960, 80th Congress, 2d Session (January, 1948).
'1 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 19 L.Ed. 604 (1869).
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Under the rulings of the Sherrer and the Coe cases, persons who
would be unable to obtain a divorce in the state of their residence, will
be able to do so in another state without a change of domicile by the
simple expedient of consent and connivance.33
NORBERT L. DOLIGALSKI
33 The effect of the Sherrer and the Coe cases on the numerous court actions
for injunctions against a domiciliary prosecuting a divorce action outside of
that state, as raised by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the note to his dissenting
opinion, supra note 23, has not been considered.
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